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Abstract
In the model, a group of investors are invited to participate to a high-yield collective project. The project
succeeds only if a minimum participation rate is reached. Before taking their decision, investors receive a
vague statement about the outcome of a past investment decision. If investors believe that the message
has an impact on the beliefs of the others, the problem can be analyzed as a typical global game and
would present a threshold equilibrium. If not, in theory both an equilibrium where all invest and an
equilibrium where no one invests can occur. In a Lab experiment, a large number of subjects adopt
switching strategies consistent with the threshold equilibrium and appear to respond to the orientation of
the message. Insights apply to contagion and market manipulation episodes.
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1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 Great Recession and the 2010-2012 turmoil in the Euro sovereign debt markets
were dramatic reminders of how disruptive nancial crises can be. Both of them carried the mark
of illiquidity: in a short lapse of time and without any premonitory alert, investors in various short-
term assets (bank commercial paper, CDOs, MBSs or "EU peripheral countries" public debt) just
vanished. In turn, the sudden asset liquidation puts at risk the survival of the borrowers, be them
large banks or governments. In an inuential book written in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 crisis,
Akerlof and Shiller (2010, p. 82) point out that "in the same way that nineteenth-century bank
depositors ed into currency in times of panic, every short-term lender may want to be the rst
in line not to renew its loans to investment banks, bank holding companies, and hedge funds".
Economists explanations to nancial crises are often grouped in two main classes (Goldstein,
2011; Goldstein and Razin, 2013). The rst class focuses on the "real factors": according to these
theories, slow and undetected deterioration in fundamentals ultimately brings about a large swing
in the equilibrium values of output and employment. The second class of explanations emphasizes
the instability of private agents beliefs about the state of the economy; a sudden deterioration
of these beliefs would prompt them to consume or to invest less, thus engineering a self-enforcing
process shifting the economy from a "good" to a "bad" equilibrium.1
Quite often, journalists but also some economists, refer to nancial crises as market panics,
with a vocabulary borrowed from psychology that emphasizes the "irrational" component of some
nancial trades.2 Bracha and Weber (2012, p. 2) describe market panics as "emotional reaction
with adverse consequences that is not (entirely) justied by existing market information". Ac-
cording to Kindleberger and Aliber (2005, p. 104), a nancial panic is "a sudden fright without
cause". The Economist on February 13, 2010 acknowledges that illiquidity is "the most emotional
of risks".
1 That sudden changes in investors beliefs can have substantial consequences on nancial markets and ultimately
on the real economy could be traced back at least to the General Theory by John Maynard Keynes in 1936.
2 The origin of the word panic comes from the god Pan, known for causing terror (Kindelberger and Liber
(2005). A medical perspective on panics can be found in the US "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders", whose fth version was published on May 2013. Main emotions associated to panic are "intense fear or
discomfort".
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Actually, as noticed by Goldstein (2011), during nancial crises emotional responses do com-
bine their e¤ects with rational decision-making where deteriorating beliefs and negative real con-
sequences are tied together. This paper aims to study whether a rumor-type "uninformative
message" can bring about a generalized "sell" movement or illiquidity, even if in the rst stage
fundamentals were invariant.
As a representative example, when the Daily Mail  a middle market UK tabloid with modest
record in economic analysis  commented on August 7, 2010 that the French bank Société Genérale
might be in big nancial troubles, the banks share price fell by 22.5% during one single trading
day, although investors gave little credit to the journals expertise in nancial accounting. As it
turned out one day later, the journalist who wrote the paper did not use any serious information
and the journal had to present formal apologizes. The next day the share price went up by 13%;
furthermore, the normal performance of the bank in the second half of the year conrmed that
the bank faced no major problem.3
Another example is provided by Orléan (1989) in what he refers to as the "Reagan e¤ect".
Taking stock on a story reported in the New York Times of December 12, 1987, he notices that
in response to a journalist query, the President Ronald Reagan commented that the dollar "has
depreciated enough". Nobody believed the President, the article relates, since operators in the
nancial markets all have doubts about the Presidents knowledge of economics. Yet the next
day all traders bought dollars, probably because everyone believed that the others will believe the
Presidents statement. The dollar ended up by appreciating in a signicant way.
In the rst part of the text we analyze in a theoretical perspective how messages bringing no
additional information about fundamentals can modify the outcome of an investment coordination
game. The structure of the problem is inspired by the classical bank-run paper by Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). There is a constant, large number of investors. Each can either invest a xed
amount in a safe, low-yield project or in a high-yield, collective investment project. The collective
project succeeds only if the participation rate exceeds an exogenously given threshold. If the
3 A formal investigation was opened by the French nancial market regulator (AMF), but no proof of intentional
market manipulation or inside trading was found. See: "French regulator warns UK paper over SocGen story",
Reuters News, January 22, 2013, Online at www.reuters.com.
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project succeeds, investors get a high, positive payo¤, if not, they get nothing. Since the success
of the project depends on many persons individual decision, the project involves a form of strategic
risk stemming from investors legitimate doubts about the willingness of the other investors to
coordinate on the most favorable outcome. As an original development in this paper, investors
must take their decision after getting a message making some vague statement about chances
that the good (bad) equilibrium has occurred in the past. A given message can be interpreted
di¤erently by various investors, depending on their psychological biases. More in detail, a positive
message can be seen as bad by a pessimistic person, while a negative message can be read as a
good one by an optimistic person. Investors have the right idea about the distribution of biases
in the population of investors, but do not know the individual bias of each other investor.
If investors discard the vague message, this coordination game presents two trivial Nash equi-
libria, the high-risk, Pareto dominant one where all investors participate to the collective project,
and the zero-risk, Pareto dominated one where no investor participates (Bryant, 1983). However,
investors might use the non-informative message as a coordination device. If they admit that the
message inuence the decision to invest of the other members of the group, then beliefs are no
longer common knowledge and the problem can be framed as a typical global game (Carlson and
Van Damme, 1993). Morris and Shin (1998) have developed an original method for determining a
coordination equilibrium in n-player global games. They applied this method to various contexts,
such as currency crises, bank runs, credit risk and illiquidity debt default (Morris and Shin, 2001;
2002; 2004; 2009). In these papers, investors observe the fundamental state of the economy with a
noise; in our paper, investors interpret a message unrelated to fundamentals with a psychological
bias. In keeping with the standard result, when messages and biases are normally distributed,
the game presents a non-trivial coordination equilibrium dening a critical message below (above)
which the project fails (succeeds). We can show that the equilibrium participation rate to the
high risk collective project is neither zero, nor one; furthermore, the participation rate will be low
when the received message is negative and vice-versa. Which one of the tree equilibria prevails is
actually an empirical issue.
What makes the empirical analysis of illiquidity crises di¢cult is just the fact that bad news,
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negative emotions, deteriorating beliefs and deteriorating fundamentals all come together; it is
therefore extremely di¢cult to infer from the data which was the "original shock". One way
to bypass these di¢culties is to resort to Lab experiments. There is an impressive experimental
literature on coordination games as surveyed by Camerer (2003) and Devetag and Ortmann (2007).
One established result is that the Pareto dominated equilibrium is rather resilient in games with
complete information, a nding rstly put forward by Van Huyck et al. (1990). On the other hand,
there are many devices  such as "cheap talk" (costless non-binding pre-play communication),
introduction of leaders, former experience with coordination, feed-back information, etc.  that
can help engineering coordination on the higher payo¤ equilibrium.4 In coordination games with
imperfect information, experiments tend to show that the Morris and Shin equilibrium dominance
prevails, with players adopting a "go/no go" threshold strategy (Heinemann et al., 2004; 2009).
In order to test the implications of the theoretical model, a controlled experiment was con-
ducted at the ESSEC Experimental Lab with subjects who answered a call for paid decision
experiments. The experiment extends the analysis by Heinemann et al. (2009) by allowing the
administrator of the experiment to provide di¤erent messages. Heinemann et al. (2009) asked sub-
jects to choose between a certain payo¤ and the uncertain payo¤ of a coordination game (strategic
uncertainty). By varying the certain amount along a monotonous scale, they can determine the
individual-specic threshold where the certain payment becomes a more attractive choice than
the risky option. They show that strategic uncertainty in coordination games is addressed by
individuals in a similar way to risk in elementary lottery choices. We use the same framework, but
introduce two treatments: some groups will receive a positive message, some groups will receive
a negative one. A signicant number of subjects (12 out of 95) will invest whatever the safe pay-
o¤, as if they discard the message and coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium. A larger
number of subjects (71 out of 95) will nonetheless adopt switching strategies as if they use the
message as a coordination device. It will be shown that negative messages are associated to a
lower participation rate to the collective investment project than positive message.
4 The paper is closest to the "cheap talk" literature (e.g. Cooper et al. 1992, Farell and Rabin, 1996, Charness,
2000) where players themselves engage in pre-play costless, unbinding communication, as well as the analysis of
the impact of an external advice on cooperation by Van Huyck at al. (1992) and Bangun et al. (2006).
4
The theoretical analysis and the experiments corroborate the intuition provided by real life
examples according to which rumors and other uninformative messages can trigger illiquidity
in asset markets. The majority of models of contagion in nancial markets take into account
"common shocks" or a hidden correlation in fundamentals between two distinct markets via trade
or nancial linkages (Summers, 2000). Our paper points to another source of contagion, where bad
news about one market (country) can have devastating e¤ects on investors in a di¤erent market
(country) even if fundamentals of the two economies are strictly independent.
The paper is organized as following: In the next section we develop our simple theoretical
model. Section 3 introduces the two experiments. Section 4 presents our conclusions.
2 Theory
2.1 Assumptions and denitions
There is a continuum of identical risk-neutral investors, with a mass normalized to 1.5 Each
individual investor can invest a xed amount Z either in a in a safe, individual project, or in a
high-yield, risky collective investment project. The safe project will bring him S (with S > Z);
the high-yield collective project will bring W in case of success (W > S) or nothing in case of
failure. Table 1 summarizes the possible payo¤s of an investor, depending on his strategy (invest
in the collective project / invest in the safe individual project) and the nal state of the collective
project (fail / success):
Collective project: fails Collective project: succeeds
Invest in collective project  Z W   Z
Invest in safe project S   Z S   Z
Table 1. The payo¤ matrix
To simplify notations, we can normalize these payo¤s:
Collective project: fails Collective project: succeeds
Invest in collective project 0 1
Invest in safe project  
5 The assumption of risk neutrality is not essential, the model could be solved for any type of preference toward
risk.
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Table 2. The normalized payo¤ matrix
with  = S=W 2]0; 1[ being the relative net gain in the safe compared to the risky project.
Let ` denote the frequency of investors who invest in the collective project, with ` 2 [0; 1].
Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we admit that the collective project succeeds if a
"critical participation rate" is reached, and fails if else. Many investment projects require a
critical mass in order to succeed. Let v denote the "critical participation rate", with v 2]0; 1[
being known and exogenously determined. Formally:
The collective project:
8>><
>>:
Succeeds if `  v
Fails if ` < v
: (1)
Prior to making their decision, investors receive a message providing a relatively vague comment
about the type of equilibrium that occurred at an undened past moment. A positive message
will claim the Pareto dominant equilibrium prevailed in the past, a negative message will claim
that the Pareto dominated equilibrium prevailed. The message does not provide any information
about the "fundamentals" of the project, i.e., it does not change or further clarify the rule of the
game, nor brings any additional information about the strategies or preferences of the subjects
involved in that decision. In this respect, we consider that the message is "uninformative". True,
if subjects have higher order beliefs about how the others will interpret this message, the message
cannot be discarded by rational players, and, without being informative in our narrow sense, it
must be taken into account.
To be more specic, depending on the strength of the claim, messages can be ranked on a
real number scale, according to a message grade : For instance, a positive  is associated to a
message such as: "in a past experiment, a close investment project has been successful". A negative
symmetric message would then state: "in a past experiment, a close investment project has failed".
A higher grade (positive) message would be more assertive: "in many similar past experiments, the
Pareto dominant equilibrium occurred systematically". We assume that the statistical distribution
of the message grade is known, and is characterized by the c.d.f. F () : R ! [0; 1]: The ex-ante
mean value of ; denoted by ; is representative of the general investors mood.
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When Nature (journalists) picks a message from the set of messages and delivers it, investor
i will have his own specic understanding of what the message actually means, given his own
psychological biases. More precisely, a message of a grade  as delivered by Nature, will be
interpreted by the individual as a statement qi =  + i; where i is assumed to be a random
variable distributed on the set of investors, with E[i] = 0 and a known c.d.f. H(i). We further
refer to qi as the "perception" of  by an individual i:
Investors might rationally decide to discard the non-informative message. In this case, the
game present two trivial Nash equilibria:
 The rst is the Pareto dominant equilibrium where all invest in the collective project: because
` = 1 > v; the collective project succeeds and all investors get 1, thus validating their choice
(1 > ); the investor who would opt for the investment in the safe project would regret his
choice:
 The second is the minimum risk Pareto dominated equilibrium where all investors prefer the
safe project and get ; as ` = 0 < v; the collective project fails. Should one individual decide
to invest, his contribution does not allow the project to succeed, thus his payo¤ would be
0 < :
However, these are not the only equilibria of the game. We will show that there exist a
"nontrivial" equilibrium where investors use the message as a coordination device. In this case,
the participation rate is positive, lower than one, and depends on the message.
2.2 Non-trivial equilibrium: the general solution
If investors take into account their own perception of the message, and the perception of the
message by the others, the problem can be analyzed as a standard n player global game, rstly
introduced and solved by Morris and Shin (1998). As Atekson (2001) emphasizes, there are two
important distributions:
 The rst is the distribution of perceptions qi across agents, conditional on the realization of
the message : The c.d.f. of this distribution is denoted by H(qi; ); it is obtained from the
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distribution of i around the mean value .
 The second is the posterior distribution over  of an agent who perceives qi: This is obtained
from Bayes rule and has the c.d.f. F (; qi); its mean value will be a weighted average between
the mean of the ex-ante distribution () and the perception qi.
If the group of investors receives a "very"negative message (such as "there is substantial evi-
dence that this type of collective investment has never succeeded"), it is highly probable that even
the most optimistic investors will chose the safe project, and that all other investors are aware
of this and do the same. To the contrary, a very positive message might prompt even the most
pessimistic investors to participate to the collective project, so all the other realize this and par-
ticipate as well. We admit that there exist a "critical message"  along our negative to positive
grade scale, such that:8>><
>>:
For    the collective project succeeds (`  v)
For  <  the collective project fails (` < v)
: (2)
In this case, an investor i (who perceives qi) will adopt a "threshold strategy", such that he will:8>><
>>:
Invest in the collective project if qi  q
Invest in the safe project if qi < q

: (3)
where q is the "cut-o¤ perception".
In this game, q and  will be determined simultaneously as equilibrium (endogenous) values.
1. The critical message equation
For a given critical perception q, the frequency of investors who prefer the safe project con-
ditional on realization of message  is Pr[qi  qj] = H(q; ): For symmetric, single peaked
statistical distributions, this function is decreasing in : It is also increasing in q: The participa-
tion rate to the risky collective project is 1 H(q; ):We know the collective project will succeed
as long as this participation rate is larger than v. For a given q, equation:
H(q; ) = 1  v (4)
implicitly denes  such that if  < ; then H(q; ) > (1   v) and the project fails; if   ;
then H(q; )  (1   v), the project succeeds. We can write  = (q; v); with @
@q
> 0 and
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@
@v
> 0:
2. The critical perception equation
For a given critical message  the probability that an individual assigns to the event that the
project fails, contingent upon his perception qi is Pr[  jqi] = F (; qi): The probability is
assessed according to the ex-post distribution of the ; the mean value of the ex-post distribution
is an increasing function in the individuals perception qi: Thus the function F (
; qi) is decreasing
in qi and is increasing in 
:
We know that an individual i will invest in the collective project if the expected gain exceeds
his certain gain from investing in the safe project (); and vice versa.
Thus equation:
1 (1  Pr[  jq]) = 
implicitly denes, for a given ; the critical perception q such that an individual who records it
is indi¤erent between investing in the collective or in the safe project. We can write q = q(; );
with @q

@
> 0 and @q

@
> 0:
As can be seen, the critical message  depends on the critical perception q and vice versa.
Hence, an equilibrium is a couple (q; ) that simultaneously fullls the two equations:
Pr[qi  qj] = 1  v (5)
Pr[  jq] = 1  : (6)
Under general statistical distributions, the system can have no solution, one solution or more
than one solution. In the next section we show that with normal distributions for  and , the
system has one solution. This denes an equilibrium where depending on the message, the project
will be either in the success or the fail state.
2.3 Non-trivial equilibrium with normal distributions
From now on we assume that Nature chooses the message from a normal distribution,   
N(; 2); where 
2
 = 1= denotes the variance of the message state along the measured charac-
teristic ( is the precision).
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We also assume that the psychological bias follows a normal distribution: i  N(0; 
2
) with
2 = 1=:
We know that when Nature picks right the equilibrium critical message , the distribution of
qi has mean 
 and precision : We can write:
Pr[qi  qj] = 
p
(q   )

; (7)
where () denotes the standard normal c.d.f.
We then remark that the posterior distribution over  of an agent who perceives qi has a mean:
E[jqi] = 
+ 
+

+ 
qi; (8)
and a precision (+ ):
For an individual that perceives exactly the critical q; the conditional probability that the
project will fail is:
Pr[  jq] = 
p
+  (   E[jq])

= 
p
+ 


+ 
(   )  
+ 
(q   )

: (9)
The system of two equations (Eq. (5) and Eq. (6)) that characterize the equilibrium becomes:

p
(q   )

= 1  v (10)

p
+ 


+ 
(   )  
+ 
(q   )

= 1  : (11)
The rst equation (Eq. 10) provides, for a given critical perception (q), the cut-o¤ message that
separates the success / fail states of the collective project6 :
 = q +
 1(v)p

; (12)
The higher the participation threshold v; the higher  and the higher chances that the project
fails.
The second equation (Eq. 11) indicates, for a given critical threshold message, what is the
perception that makes the individual indi¤erent between investing in the safe or in the risky
6 Recall that  1(1  x) =    1(x):
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project:
q =

1 +



   

+
p
+ 

 1 () : (13)
For a given ; the higher the payo¤ associated to the safe project (), the higher the critical
perception q and the larger the frequency of investors who prefer the safe project.
The two functions can be represented in the (O; Oq) space as two straight lines with a
di¤erent positive slope. They can cross only once, at the equilibrium critical values (; q).
Hence, in this simple framework, the equilibrium is unique, whatever the variance of  and :7
The only cases where the non-trivial equilibrium does not exist are  ! 1; i.e. there is no bias
in interpreting the message, and ! 0; i.e. the variance of  tends to innity (the distribution of
 looks like an uniform distribution on ( 1;+1)): We will not consider these extreme cases.
Solving the system, we obtain rstly the equilibrium cut-o¤ message:
 =  
p
+ 

 1() 
p


 1(v): (14)
If the group of investors receive a message 
0
< ; then the project will fail because less than v
investors will participate, and if they receive a message 
1
> ; then the project will succeed. It
is interesting to remark that for some values of  and v (for instance, if both are lower than 0.5),
we have  > : In this case, there is a set of "good messages"  in the sense that they are rated
above the expected rating,  2 [; ]  where default can still happen.
Next, the equilibrium critical perception is:
q =  
p
+ 

 1() 

 + 

p


 1(v): (15)
We have denoted by ` the frequency of investors who participate to the collective project. Thus, if
nature picks a message  = 
0
; the signal distribution will be centered around 
0
; all persons with
qi  q will participate and all those with qi < q will prefer the safe project. The participation
rate is:
` = 1  
p
(q   
0
)

: (16)
7 In all other applications of the Morris and Shin (1998), the uniqueness of the equilibrium relies on strict
conditions about the variances of the two key random variables (state of the economy and noise).
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First, we notice that this frequency is neither zero, nor one as it is in the trivial Nash equilibria with
ignored information. Second, this frequency increases with message grade. For the equilibrium q,
if the message is more positive, more investors will participate to the collective project: @`=@
0
> 0:
To sum up the theoretical section, this game presents two trivial Nash equilibria, one involving
a participation rate ` = 1; and the other involving a participation rate ` = 0: In the third, non-
trivial equilibrium, the participation rate is strictly positive, but lower than one: ` 2 (0; 1):While
intuition would suggest that the most plausible case is the latter, theory only does not allow to
select one of them. It it therefore a sensible research strategy to observe how human subjects play
this game in the controlled environment of the Lab.
3 A Lab experiment
3.1 Experimental design
The experiment can be seen as a (lighter) variant of the experiment used by Heinemann et al.
(2009) to measure aversion to strategic uncertainty; we adapt it in order to study the consequences
of irrelevant messages on the decision of the subjects to participate to a coordination game.
Should the frequency of investors respond to the message, this would suggest that the non-trivial
equilibrium is at work; hence investors take into account the potential impact of the message on
the beliefs of the other investors. Messages are delivered through the computer interface. This
corresponds to an "almost common knowledge" setup, as dened by Bangun et al. (2006), as
compared to a "common knowledge" variant where the information would have been displayed on
a blackboard that could be observed by everyone simultaneously, as in Van Huyck et al (1992).
We run four sessions: two were performed at the LESSAC (the Experimental Lab of ESC
Dijon) on March 29, 2013 and two were realized at the ESSEC Experimental Lab on April 23,
2013 and Mai 15, 2014 with a total of 95 subjects. Subjects were recruited from the student
population of the schools, who answered to a call for paid decision experiments. Instructions
were presented via computer interface and all interactions were computerized. The program was
written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each subject was assigned at random with a PC terminal.
We make sure that no subject has participated more than once in this experiment. At the end of
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the experiment subjects were paid in cash (one of their multiple choices was selected at random).
The average time spend in the Lab was 25 minutes; on average they earned 16.30 euros including
a 5 euros show-up compensation.8
At the outset of the experiment, subjects were matched at random in groups of ve. There
were more than two groups in each session, to prevent students to identify each other. Before
starting the experiment, subjects were required to answer several questions, to makes sure that
they understood the rules. The experiment started after all subjects provided correct answers to
these questions.
In the test, subjects face 20 independent choices (situations), organized in two distinct blocks
of 10 situations each. The rst block tests is the most important because it tests the coordination
game; the second block tests an elementary lottery used for a robustness check. In each situation,
the subject must chose between an option A and an option B. Option A provides a certain payo¤,
varying from 1.50 euros to 15 euros, in increments of 1.50 within each block. The payo¤ for option
B is either 0 or 15. In the coordination game the 15 euro payo¤ is delivered provided that at
least three subjects out of ve chose option B.9 In the elementary lottery, the probability of the
15 euro payo¤ is 0.5. In order to make sure that there is no carry-over e¤ect from the lottery
to the coordination game which is central to our analysis, we asked subjects to play rstly the
coordination game, and then the lottery. Instructions are provided in a Web Appendix.10
Figure 1 presents the basic decision screen for the coordination game, identical to the decision
screen used by Heinemann et al. (2009). Option B is invariant from one situation to the other;
option A is the safe bet, whose payo¤ is increasing from 1.5 to 15 from decision 1 to decision 10.
The decision screen for the lottery is similar, except that option B is the lottery (0;15) with 0.5
winning chances.
At the end of the experiment, one of the 20 options is drawn at random by the computer and
subjects are paid according to the actual choices they made in the experiment. In the random
8 This generous compensation was somehow imposed by the payo¤ structure - similar to the experiment by
Heinemann et al. (2009).
9 Heinemann et al. (2009) test the game for groups of various sizes and for di¤erent participation theresholds.
10 Web address: http://behavioralresearchlab.essec.edu/research/research-topics/results
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Figure 1: Main decision screen: Coordination game (based on Heinemman et al. 2009)
lottery, the computer performs a random draw with the 0.5 probability.
Such a "multiple price list" provides an incentive for subjects to determine a threshold strategy
(Heinemann et al. 2004). Subjects make up their mind about the payo¤ in the uncertain (risky)
choice, and compare it with the certain payo¤. Normally they should switch only once, having
a preference for the risky choice if the certain payo¤ is low, and vice versa. When individuals
present such threshold strategies, the number of times they choose option B can be interpreted as
a measure of their preference toward risk.
Table 5 presents the individual payo¤ for each situation k; where sk is the secure payo¤,
sk 2 [1:5; 3; 4:5; :::; 15]: This payo¤ structure is similar to the payo¤ matrix in the theoretical
section, with k = sk=15:
Collective project fails Collective project succeeds
Invest in collective project 0 15
Take the safe option sk sk
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Table 5. The payo¤ matrix in the Lab experiment
At di¤erence with Heinemann et al. (2009), we split the population in two randomly selected
subgroups. Before the decision screens were displayed, one group received through the computer
interface a "positive" message, and the other group received a "negative" message. It was made
clear from the outset that a message will be provided prior to any investment decision, and that
all members of the group will receive the same message.
The "positive" message:
"In a past experiment, subjects that had chosen the risky option were satised with their choice"
The "negative" message:
"In a past experiment, subjects that had chosen the risky option were disappointed by their
choice"
Messages bring no additional objective information about the game subjects must play. It
states something about a vague "past experiment" (not necessarily identical), and comment about
"satisfaction / disappointment", without any precise information about the actual outcome of the
game. It provides no information about other past experiments that might have delivered a
di¤erent outcome. Worlds such as "satisfaction" and "disappointment" seem to be su¢ciently
vague to open the door for individual interpretations of its meaning for himself and for the others.
While they have a clear positive / negative ordering, they are not excessive.
 Results
Overall the experiment was played by 95 subjects.
Five of them presented inconsistent choices, i.e. shifted from B to A more than once, either in
the coordination game or the lottery choice.11
Two participants are not rational given that they refuse the lottery when the safe payo¤ is small
and prefer the lottery when the safe payo¤ is large. Six participants prefer the lottery whatever
11 Heinemann et al. (2009) report on rates of inconsistent choices between 1 to 15% depending on the place
where experiments were run.
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the safe payo¤; their behavior is not rational either given that they also prefer the lottery (0;15)
to the safe payo¤ 15.
Then 12 subjects will always prefer the coordination game (0;15); among them, 7 have received
the positive message, 5 the negative message. They present various degrees of risk aversion; the
average number of B-choices in the lottery condition is 5.41 (standard deviation 3.00); two of them
refused the lottery even against the smallest safe payo¤. This extremely cooperative behavior,
including on behalf of subjects who received a negative message, suggests that some of them
discard the non-informative message and settle on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
The other 71 subjects implemented clear switching strategies in the coordination game (the
Morris and Shin solution) as if they were using the message as a coordination device; they also
shift only once in the lottery.
Typical coordination choice Typical lottery choice Number
Inconsistent BBAABAABBB BBAABAABBB 5
Lottery: Not rational BBBBAAAAA AAABBBBBBB 2
Lottery: Not rational BBBBBBBBBB BBBBBBBBBB 5
Always coordinate; risk aversion BBBBBBBBBB BBBBBAAAAA 12
Switching strategy; risk aversion BBBBBBAAAA BBBBBAAAAA 71
Table 6. Distribution of subjects according to the nature of the decisions
In the following the analysis focuses on these 71 subjects playing switching strategies in the
coordination game. Table 7 presents the average number of B-choices for each condition (coordi-
nation and lottery), depending on the message:
Message Nb. subjects
Av. nb. B-choices
Coordination game
Av. nb. B-choices
Elementary lottery
Positive 34 6.82 (6.177.47) 4.38 (3.844.92)
Negative 37 6.13 (5.456.81) 4.55 (4.184.89)
Table 7. Average number of B-choices for subjects who play switching strategies
(between brackets: the 95% condence interval)
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In the lottery case, when a player chooses option B for the last time at decision 4, he is
preferring the lottery to a certain 6 euro payo¤ but is not preferring the lottery to a certain 7.5
euro payo¤. He is a risk-averse or risk neutral player. When a player chooses option B for the last
time at decision 5, he is preferring the lottery to a 7.5 euro certain payo¤, he is a moderate risk
loving player. According to the elementary lottery gures, in general subjects are risk neutral or
risk averse.
Within each treatment, investors were more averse to the pure risk as generated by the lottery
than to the strategic risk specic to the coordination game (p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis test is
0.99).
The average number of B choices in the lottery is very close in the two treatments (4.38 vs.
4.55): the message has little impact on the lottery choice. In the coordination game, the positive
message is associated with a higher average number of B-choices as compared with the negative
message (6.82 vs. 6.13), but we cannot conrm that the di¤erence is statistically signicant - the
p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis test is 0.20.
In the context of our analysis, an interesting result pertains to the frequency of individuals
who decided to invest in the collective project, for varying payo¤s k and depending on the type
of message (Figure 2).
When the safe project brings little (less than 3 euros), all investors prefer the collective project,
whatever the message. Yet whenever the safe project brings more than 4.5 euros, some players
will chose it; the frequency of players investing in the collective project is declining when the safe
payo¤ increases. At 13.5 euros for the safe project, there are still 38% who prefer the collective
project under the positive message, and 20% who prefer the collective project under the negative
message. This tells us that di¤erent individuals reach their critical q for di¤erent safe payo¤s (it
does not tell us how two groups of identical individuals, one playing with a high safe payo¤ and
the other with a low safe payo¤ will chose their respective q):
In line with the prediction of the theoretical model, more subjects will prefer the collective
projects if the message is positive as compared to the case when the message is negative; this
pattern holds for all lambdas except the very low ones.
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Figure 2: Frequency of individuals who opt for the collective project (choose the B option)
4 Conclusion
This paper analyses whether more or less vague messages about the past outcome of an investment
game have "real" consequences on the way subjects coordinate on a current investment decision.
In a narrow sense these messages can be referred to as uninformative insofar as they bring no
additional information about the fundamentals of the current game. Some people may rationally
choose to discard them.
We rst study a theoretical problem where investors have the choice between a safe, low-yield
project, and a high-yield collective investment project. The collective project succeeds only if
a critical mass of investors participate. The game has almost all the characteristics of a full
information game: the rule and the payo¤s are common knowledge. However, individuals receive
a message, common to all, unrelated to the fundamentals of the game, that can be interpreted
by participants depending on their psychological biases. If subjects discard the uninformative
message, the game presents two trivial Nash equilibria, the high-risk, Pareto dominant one where
all individuals participate, and the low-risk, Pareto dominated one where nobody invests in the
collective project. If subjects use the non informative message to coordinate their actions, the
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game presents a "non-trivial" threshold strategy equilibrium as shown by Morris and Shin (1998);
we solve the problem for the threshold value of the message above which the critical participation
is achieved. In the non-trivial equilibrium the frequency of investors who choose to participate is a
positive number lower than one. Furthermore, when this equilibrium is at work, the participation
rate is larger for positive messages as compared to negative messages.
We implement a controlled experiment to study which of the three equilibria prevails. Individ-
uals were matched in groups and were asked to choose between a safe bet and the outcome of a
coordination game that delivers a large payo¤ only if a critical mass of investors participate. Half
of the groups received a negative message, half of the groups received a positive message.
While 12 out of 95 subjects presented an inconsistent or irrational behavior, 12 subjects be-
haved as if they discarded the message and coordinated their decision so as to support the Pareto
dominant equilibrium. A much larger number (71 subjects) implemented a clear switching strat-
egy, suggesting that individuals use the non-informative message as a coordination device. The
frequency of individuals who choose the collective project is lower in groups that receive a negative
non-informative message as compared to groups that receive a (symmetric) positive message.
Tests were conducted with no variation in the critical participation threshold or group size,
as extensively tested by Heinemann et al. (2009). Further research might extend the analysis
in this direction. We considered only two messages, one conveying a positive and the other
a symmetric negative assessment. It would be interesting to test the game for a wider range
of messages. Another extension of the model would consider messages that convey both some
relevant information about the fundamentals and irrelevant information.
Such a simple theoretical model backed by experimental evidence sheds its own light on a
given type of market panics. It emphasizes that "cheap but emotional talk" might have strong
consequences on nancial trades. In particular, the mechanism outlined in this paper provides an
explanation to a specic form of contagion, where bad news in one market can cause trouble in
another market, even if fundamentals of the two markets are strictly independent.
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